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Abstract—Spread Transform Dither Modulation (STDM), as
an extension of Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) is a
blind watermarking scheme that achieves high robustness against
random noise and re-quantization attacks, with a limitation
against the Fixed Gain Attack (FGA). In this paper, we improve
the STDM watermarking scheme by making the quantization
step size dependent on the watermarked content to resist the
FGA attack. Simulations on real images show that our approach
achieves strong robustness against the FGA attack, the Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) attack, and the JPEG compres-
sion attack while preserving a higher level of transparency.
Index Terms—Digital watermarking, QIM, STDM, Robustness,
Transparency, FGA, AWGN, JPEG compression.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the explosive growth of the internet and wireless
networks, digital watermarking has received a great attention
in research, which aims to protect digital contents like images
[1], videos [2], audios [3], and PDF documents [4]. Several
image watermarking schemes were performed in spatial do-
main, where the watermark is embedded directly in the pixel
intensity values of an image, or in the frequency domain,
where the watermark is embedded into the frequency domain
of an image transform using the DCT, DFT, DWT or SVD [5],
[6]. Watermarking schemes are generally classified as additive
class known by Spread Spectrum (SS) schemes introduced by
Cox et al. [7]–[9] and substitutive class known by Quantization
Index Modulation (QIM) introduced by Chen and Wornell
[10]. The basic QIM quantize a sample element to the nearest
quantization point according to a message bit m. An important
extension of QIM is the Spread Transform Dither Modulation
(STDM), which embed a single bit of the message into a
host-vector by quantizing the projection of the host-vector
onto a random vector p. STDM combines the robustness of
Spread Spectrum system and the effectiveness of QIM. Thus,
it achieves higher robustness against additive noise and re-
quantization attacks, but still largely vulnerable to the FGA
attack. In this latter type of attack, the received signal is
multiplied by a scaling factor ρ, which scales the watermark
vector and shifts it away from its original quantization cell.
Therefore, the decoder will be unable to correctly estimate the
embedded message. However, Bartolini et al. [11] analyzed
the performance of STDM against the FGA attack and quan-
tization attack. Based on their analysis, STDM has superior
robustness against the quantization attack than the FGA attack,
since even for values of a scaling factor ρ close to 1, the
error probability becomes excessively high. Perez-Gonzalez
et al. [12] proposed the Rational Dither Modulation (RDM)
to provide invariance to FGA attack. In RDM, the feature
signal for quantization is constructed using the ratio of the
previously generated watermarked sample and the current host
sample. RDM achieves a better performance against the FGA
attack, with a limitation against the additive noise. A number
of solutions have been proposed using perceptual models [13]–
[18] based on Watson’s model [19] to improve the fidelity
and provide robustness to FGA attack. Watson provides a
perceptual model for computing the slack associated with each
DCT coefficient within an 8×8 block, and those slacks are
used to select the projection vector and/or to determine the
quantization step size during the embedding and decoding
process. However, this step could introduce a security problem,
since that the projection vector could be selected easily by
an opponent. Most of the proposed watermarking schemes
are applied in the frequency domain and could only be
implemented on images to resist the FGA attack, since that
they are dependent on the luminance and contrast making
of images.The robustness is examined in the DCT domain,
i.e. the DCT coefficients are quantized rather than the pixel
values. In this paper, we modified the traditional STDM
watermarking scheme and applied it on the grayscale images
in the spatial domain and frequency domain to compare it
with other proposed methods. Our method is more flexible
and is not dependent on the perceptual model to achieve the
robustness to the FGA attack.
This paper recalls some backgrounds on STDM in Section
2. The proposed N-STDM method is presented in Section 3.
Experiments on real images are shown in Section 4. Finally,
in Section 5 we give our conclusion and future work.
II. BACKGROUND
STDM [10] is a special case of QIM, where the quantization
occurs entirely in the projection of the host signal x onto
a random projection vector p. By this way, the embedding-
induced distortion is spreading into all groups of samples
instead of one.
The embedded function is given by:
y = x+ (Qm(x
T p,∆)− xT p)p
= x+
(
round
(
xT p− dm
∆
)
∆ + dm − xT p
)
p (1)
where ∆ represents the quantization factor, round() is the
rounding value to the nearest integer, and dm denotes the dither
level based on the message bit m ∈ {0, 1}:
d0 = −∆
4
and d1 =
∆
4
(2)
To extract the embedded message, the detection can be per-
formed with a minimum distance decoder as the form:
mˆ = arg min
m∈{0,1}
| yT p−Qm(yT p,∆) | (3)
When the FGA attack is applied on the watermarked signal y,
it becomes:
z = ρ · y (4)
and mˆ will be decoded as follow:
mˆ = arg min
m∈{0,1}
| ρ · yT p−Qm(ρ · yT p,∆) | (5)
Qm(ρ · yT p,∆) 6= ρ ·Qm(yT p,∆)
Qm(ρ · yT p,∆) = round
(
ρ · yT p− dm
∆
)
∆ + dm
ρ ·Qm(yT p,∆) = round
(
yT p− dm
∆
)
ρ ·∆ + ρ · dm
The decoded message can be thus different from the embedded
one, and the robustness against the FGA attack cannot be
obtained.
III. PROPOSED N-STDM METHOD
The traditional STDM scheme is affected by the FGA
attack. Hence, we need to make the quantization step size
dependent on the watermarked samples.
We normalized the STDM embedding function as:
y = x+
(
‖x‖Qm
(
xT p
‖x‖ ,∆
)
− xT p
)
p m ∈ {0, 1}. (6)
‖x‖ = (|x1| 1u + |x2| 1u + ...+ |xn| 1u )u (7)
where n is the length of the extracted vector from the cover
elements, |xn| is the absolute value of element xn, and ‖x‖
is a norm function that could be expressed as a l2-norm when
u = 1/2 and l1-norm when u = 1 etc. Section IV details the
influence of ‖x‖ against the FGA attack while varying u.
Thus, if we perform the FGA attack s.t. z = ρy, then the
modification is also applied to the minimum distance decoder
as:
mˆ = arg min
m∈{0,1}
| z˜ − ‖z‖Qm
(
z˜
‖z‖ ,∆
)
|
= arg min
m∈{0,1}
| ρ · y˜ − ρ · ‖y‖Qm
(
ρ · y˜
ρ · ‖y‖ ,∆
)
|
= arg min
m∈{0,1}
| ρ
(
y˜ − ‖y‖Qm
(
y˜
‖y‖ ,∆
))
| (8)
Fig. 1: The original images (first and third columns) and cor-
responding watermarked images (second and fourth columns)
using the N-STDM method for u=2 with a 4096-bit message
embedded and PSNR=45 dB.
where:
y˜ = yT p (9)
Therefore, the non-linear impact of the ρ factor in the Quan-
tization is now linear and consequently will not affect the
process of decoding the message.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS
The algorithm is parametrized by two variables, which
are the u factor presented in (7) and the elements that are
considered to compute the norm. The first experiments aimed
at finding optimal values for these parameters with respect to
the results against the FGA attack. We compared our proposed
method against the FGA attack while varying u using two
forms. In the first one (Global form), we compute the norm
value ‖x‖ of the whole pixels of the cover image which will be
used to embed all the watermark bits. In the second one (Local
form), we compute the norm value ‖x‖ of each vector, in
which we will embed the ith bit of the watermark. Therefore,
each bit will have a specific norm value. In the experiments,
the 10 grayscale images with size 512×512 presented in Fig.
1 have been used as a host signal, the length of the projection
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Fig. 2: Robustness of N-STDM (Global form) against Fixed
Gain Attack in term of BER while varying u with PSNR=45
dB.
          
































Fig. 3: Robustness of N-STDM (Local form) against Fixed
Gain Attack in term of BER while varying u with PSNR=45
dB.
vector is set to 64, which allows a 4096-bit message to be
embedded into each image, and all the parameters are adjusted
to have watermarked images with the same Peak Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (PSNR=45 dB).
Fig. 2 shows the robustness of N-STDM method against FGA
attack when varying u between 1/5 and 5 using the global
form. The BER decrease when u increases with preferable
results when u is higher than 1.
Fig. 3 shows the robustness of N-STDM against FGA attack
using the local form. In this situation, the N-STDM has a good
performance whenever is the value of u. But in some cases, it
still better to use the global form since the same norm value
‖x‖ is used to embed all the bits of the watermark, and by
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Fig. 4: Robustness against Fixed Gain Attack in term of BER
with PSNR=45 dB.
this way, all the watermarked vectors in the image will have an
identical imperceptibility. To conclude these experiments, the
parameter values that provide the results with the lowest errors
are u=2 and a global form for the norm. In the subsequent
experiments, these values have been selected.
Next, we have evaluated the correction of the N-STDM water-
marking scheme. In other words, we have verified that when
a message is embedded into a host signal, and when there is
no attack, the message is extracted without any error. To do
so, 1000 grayscale images with size 512×512 extracted from
Boss image database [20] are used as host signal. The length
of the projection vector is set to 64, which allows a 4096-bit
message to be embedded into each image. The quantization
step size ∆ is adjusted in order to have the same PSNR=45
dB for all the watermarked images. For all the images, the Bit-
Error-Rate (BER) of the extracted watermark is always equal
to 0, which leads us the convincing idea that any embedded
message could be retrieved and without errors when the attacks
are not applied.
After that, the visual aspect of the presented approach has been
studied. The length of the projection vector is set to 64, which
allows a 4096-bit message to be embedded into each image.
Fig. 1 shows a part of grayscale images. The second and fourth
columns display the obtained watermarked images using the
N-STDM method with a PSNR=45 dB. These watermarked
images look almost the same as the original ones, and it is
impossible to distinguish them by human eyes.
A. Comparison in Spatial Domain
In this section, we compared the robustness in the spatial
domain of our proposed approach with the traditional STDM
watermarking scheme and RDM [12] against the FGA attack
and AWGN attack. The experiments are conducted on the
grayscale images of size 512×512. The length of the projec-
tion vector is set to 64 which allows a 4096-bit message to be
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Fig. 5: Robustness against AWGN attack in term of BER with
PSNR=45 dB.
embedded into each image and all the parameters are adjusted
to have watermarked images with the same PSNR=45 dB.
As shown in Fig. 4, N-STDM and RDM have good robustness
against the FGA attack. STDM has superior robustness against
the quantization attack than the FGA attack, since even for
values of a gain factor as close to 1, as 1.1 or 0.9, the BER
becomes excessively high.
With RDM, the feature signal for quantization is constructed
using the ratio of the previously generated watermarked sam-
ple and the current host sample. For that, it resists the FGA
attack but will be affected by the AWGN attack as shown in
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Fig. 6: Block diagrams of the N-STDM method (a) and the
family methods based on Watson’s model (b).
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Fig. 7: Robustness against Fixed Gain Attack in term of BER
with PSNR=45 dB.
Fig. 5. N-STDM make the quantization step size dependent
on the watermarked samples, which will scale linearly with
the FGA attack. Therefore, this method resists the FGA
attack while preserving superior robustness against the AWGN
attack.
B. Comparison in Frequency Domain
To test the performance of N-STDM in the frequency
domain, we implement the DCT on the grayscale images of
size 512×512 as shown in Fig. 6a. First of all, we compute
the norm value ‖x‖ of the original image to be used during
the embedding process. After that, we divide the image into
8×8 blocks of pixels, through which we will perform the
DCT transform to get the DCT coefficients. A part of these
coefficients will be used as a host vector of length L, in which
we will embed the ith bit of the watermark message m. Then
we perform the inverse DCT transform at each block to get the
watermarked image. Our proposed scheme is compared with
I-ASTDM [14], STDM-MW-SS [15] and STDM-SP-wm [17];
family methods with small variation related to the perceptual
model. The block diagram of those family methods is shown in
Fig. 6b, where the quantization step size ∆ is modified based
on the slacks vectors S computed using Watson’s model.
Meanwhile, the FGA attack, AWGN attack, and JPEG com-
pression are used to verify the performance of our proposed
scheme. For all the algorithms we used the 2nd-21st DCT
coefficients in zig-zag-scanned order of each 8×8 block, in
which we embed 1 bit of the watermark. The embedding
rate is 1/64, i.e. one bit in each 8×8 block, which allows
the embedding of a 4096-bit message into each image. The
parameters of all methods are adjusted so that the PSNR value
of all the watermarked images is equal to 45 dB. As expected,
according to Fig. 7, all the proposed schemes have good
robustness against FGA attack in the frequency domain. With
the I-ASTDM watermarking scheme, ∆ is modified based on
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Fig. 8: Robustness against AWGN in term of BER with
PSNR=45 dB.
Watson’s model using the slacks of the contrast masking. By
this way, ∆ will scales linearly with the FGA attack. As for
STDM-MW-SS watermarking scheme, the slack values of the
images which are computed based on Watson’s model are used
as a projection vector, and they are used to modify the values
of ∆. Therefore, ∆ scales linearly with the FGA attack. In
the STDM-SP-wm watermarking scheme, the slack vectors
are computed based on Watson’s model and projected onto
a projection vector p to select ∆, which will scale linearly
with the FGA attack. Therefore, those methods could only be
applied to images and in the frequency domain based on DCT
transform. In contrast, N-STDM makes the quantization step
size dependent on the watermarked samples to resists the FGA
attack and could be applied on images or any other element
in the spatial and frequency domain.
The robustness against AWGN attack has been tested in term
of BER while varying the standard deviation between 1 and
8. As shown in Fig. 8, our proposed N-STDM watermarking
scheme achieve better performance, and the BER always tend
to 0 when the standard deviation is lower than 5.
Fig. 9 illustrates the robustness to JPEG compression in term
of BER while varying the JPEG quality between 10 and 100,
which denotes the compressibility of the JPEG compressor;
lower numbers mean lower quality. N-STDM have a better
performance against the JPEG compression, and the BER tend
to 0 when the JPEG quality is higher than 50.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a blind image watermarking
using normalized STDM robust against FGA attack. Our
proposed N-STDM scheme make the quantization step size
dependent on the watermarked samples. Therefore, ∆ will
scale linearly with the FGA attack. We have applied our
approach on the grayscale images in the spatial domain and
frequency domain based on the DCT transform.
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Fig. 9: Robustness against JPEG compression in term of BER
with PSNR=45 dB.
The modified STDM family methods could only be applied
on images in the frequency domain to resist the FGA attack,
since that the quantization step size has been adjusted based
on the luminance and contrast masking of images. But our
approach is more flexible, could be applied in the spatial or
frequency domain, and any element can be used as support to
contain the watermark.
The experimental results confirm that the N-STDM approach
achieves the robustness against the FGA attack and also
manifest good performance facing the AWGN attack and JPEG
compression while preserving a higher level of transparency.
As for future enhancements, we plan to execute the theoretical
proof of the practice evidence presented in Section IV, to
include further improvement of the N-STDM watermarking
scheme and apply it to other types of digital content such as
PDF documents.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is partially funded with support from the National
Council for Scientific Research in Lebanon CNRS-L, the
Hubert Curien CEDRE programme, the Agence Universitaire
de la Francophonie AUF-PCSI programme, and the Labex
ACTION program (contract ANR-11-LABX-01-01).
REFERENCES
[1] R. Darazi, P. Callau, and B. Macq, “Secure and hvs-adaptive exhibition
spread transform dither modulation watermarking for digital cinema,” in
2009 First IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and
Security (WIFS), Dec 2009, pp. 1–5.
[2] A. Mansouri, A. M. Aznaveh, F. Torkamani-Azar, and F. Kurugollu,
“A low complexity video watermarking in h. 264 compressed domain,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 5, no. 4,
pp. 649–657, 2010.
[3] V. Bhat, I. Sengupta, and A. Das, “An adaptive audio watermarking
based on the singular value decomposition in the wavelet domain,”
Digital Signal Processing, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 1547–1558, 2010.
[4] A. W. Bitar, R. Darazi, J.-F. Couchot, and R. Couturier, “Blind digital
watermarking in pdf documents using spread transform dither modula-
tion,” Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 143–161,
2017.
[5] C.-C. Lai and C.-C. Tsai, “Digital image watermarking using discrete
wavelet transform and singular value decomposition,” IEEE Transactions
on instrumentation and measurement, vol. 59, no. 11, pp. 3060–3063,
2010.
[6] A. K. Singh, M. Dave, and A. Mohan, “Hybrid technique for robust and
imperceptible image watermarking in dwt–dct–svd domain,” National
Academy Science Letters, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 351–358, 2014.
[7] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon, “Secure spread spec-
trum watermarking for images, audio and video,” in Image Processing,
1996. Proceedings., International Conference on, vol. 3. IEEE, 1996,
pp. 243–246.
[8] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, F. T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon, “Secure spread
spectrum watermarking for multimedia,” IEEE transactions on image
processing, vol. 6, no. 12, pp. 1673–1687, 1997.
[9] H. S. Malvar and D. A. Floreˆncio, “Improved spread spectrum: A new
modulation technique for robust watermarking,” IEEE transactions on
signal processing, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 898–905, 2003.
[10] B. Chen and G. W. Wornell, “Quantization index modulation: a class
of provably good methods for digital watermarking and information
embedding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 47, no. 4,
pp. 1423–1443, May 2001.
[11] F. Bartolini, M. Barni, and A. Piva, “Performance analysis of st-dm
watermarking in presence of nonadditive attacks,” IEEE Transactions
on Signal Processing, vol. 52, no. 10, pp. 2965–2974, 2004.
[12] F. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, C. Mosquera, M. Barni, and A. Abrardo, “Rational
dither modulation: A high-rate data-hiding method invariant to gain
attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 53, no. 10, pp.
3960–3975, 2005.
[13] Q. Li and I. J. Cox, “Using perceptual models to improve fidelity
and provide invariance to valumetric scaling for quantization index
modulation watermarking,” in Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing,
2005. Proceedings.(ICASSP’05). IEEE International Conference on,
vol. 2. IEEE, 2005, pp. ii–1.
[14] X. Zhu, “Image-adaptive spread transform dither modulation using
human visual model,” in Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006
International Conference on, vol. 2. IEEE, 2006, pp. 1571–1574.
[15] Q. Li and I. J. Cox, “Improved spread transform dither modulation using
a perceptual model: robustness to amplitude scaling and jpeg compres-
sion,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2007. ICASSP 2007.
IEEE International Conference on, vol. 2. IEEE, 2007, pp. II–185.
[16] D. Yu, L. Ma, G. Wang, and H. Lu, “Adaptive spread-transform dither
modulation using an improved luminance-masked threshold,” in Image
Processing, 2008. ICIP 2008. 15th IEEE International Conference on.
IEEE, 2008, pp. 449–452.
[17] X. Li, J. Liu, J. Sun, X. Yang, and W. Liu, “Step-projection-based spread
transform dither modulation,” IET information security, vol. 5, no. 3, pp.
170–180, 2011.
[18] W. Wan, J. Liu, J. Sun, X. Yang, X. Nie, and F. Wang, “Logarithmic
spread-transform dither modulation watermarking based on perceptual
model,” in Image Processing (ICIP), 2013 20th IEEE International
Conference on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 4522–4526.
[19] A. B. Watson, “Dct quantization matrices visually optimized for indi-
vidual images,” in Human vision, visual processing, and digital display
IV, vol. 1913. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 1993,
pp. 202–217.
[20] T. Filler, T. Pevny´, S. Craver, and A. D. Ker, Eds., Information Hiding
- 13th International Conference, IH 2011, Prague, Czech Republic,
May 18-20, 2011, Revised Selected Papers, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 6958. Springer, 2011. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24178-9
